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Does
INFORMATION
AGREEMENT
By Carl E. Schneider, '79,
and Michael H. Farrell
The human understanding is not a dry light,
but is infused by desire and emotion, which
give rise to 'wishful science.' For man prefers
to believe what he wants to be true. He
therefore rejects dijficulties, being impatient
of inquiry; sober things, because they restrict
his hope; deeper parts of nature, because of
his superstition; the light of experience,
because of his arrogance and pride, lest his
mind should seem to concern itself with
things mean and tran.sitory; things that are
strange and contrary to all expectation,
because of common opinion.

-

Francis Bacon
Novum Organum

The following essay is based on a talk
delivered last summer in England and on
the chapter "Information, Decisions, and the
Limits of Informed Consent," in (Michael
Freeman and Andrew D E Lewis, eds) Law
and Medicine Current Legal Issues 2000,
Volume 3 (Oxford University Press, 2000)
This version appears with permission of
the publisher
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For many years, a principal labor of
bioethics has been to find a way of
confiding medical decisions to patients and
not to doctors. The foremost mechanism
for doing so has been the doctrine of
informed consent. The theory of and hopes
for that doctrine are well captured in the
influential case of Canterbury v. Spence (464
F2d772, 780 [DC Cir 1972]): 'True
consent to what happens to one's self is the
informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate
knowledgeably the options available and
the risks attendant upon each."
Anxious as bioethicists and courts have
been to promulgate this doctrine, they
have been less anxious to discover how
well it works. The bioethical tradition has
been far more interested in articulating
principle than testing practice. But as Law
School Professor Don Herzog drolly warns,
"theory had better not be what you get
when you leave out the facts." So in this
chapter we will reflect on the empirical
literature on informed consent and present
some findings of a study on the way men
decide whether to use PSA (prostate
specific antigen) screening to detect
prostate cancer. This will lead us to reflect
on the limits of informed consent.
The success of informed consent
depends on two things. First, patients must
be able to understand and remember the
information doctors give them. Second,
patients must be able to analyze that
information and use it to make a decision.
The first of these requirements has been
studied extensively. Despite prolonged
struggle to improve informed consent,
success remains elusive. As Cassileth et al.
wrote some years ago, "It is well known
that many patients, despite all efforts to the
contrary, remember or understand little of
what they agree to during the consent
process." And as Cassileth et a different al.
said, studies of informed consent "have
shown that patients remain inadequately
informed, even when extraordinary efforts
are made to provide complete information
and to ensure their understanding. This
appears to be true regardless of the amount
of information delivered, the manner in
which it is presented, or the type of
medical procedure involved." What is
worse, the sicker patients become, the less
they understand and retain.
The second requirement for the success
of informed consent - that patients be
able to analyze the information they are
given - has, in contrast, been virtually

unstudied. We have been interested in
what patients hear, but not in how they
consider what they hear. Yet what evidence
we have is deeply unsettling. As Irving
Janis says, "[T]he stresses of making major
decisions and the various ways people deal
with those stresses ... frequently result in
defective forms of problem solving that fail
to meet the standards of rational decision
making."
In The Practice of Autonomy: Patients,
Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford
University Press, 1998), Schneider suggests
that most people regard making decisions
of all kinds as forbidding work and that
medical decisions are exceptionally
challenging. Doctors themselves must often
try to draw sound conclusions from
dynamic and unreliable data and
problematic theories. Thus, the
information patients receive is often
frustratingly uncertain. Worse, doctors
most comfortably speak to patients in the
language of medicine, a tongue that
dismays even the brightest and besteducated patients. And while information
cannot be put in completely objective
terms, often neither doctor nor patient
recognizes the assumptions and
preferences recommendations silently
embody.
The Practice of Autonomy further suggests
that medical decisions are made yet harder
because of their social and moral context.
Medicine is becoming bureaucratized. This
means that an astonishing number of
people may have information and opinions
to contribute to a medical decision, that
the players change rapidly, and that
responsibility is diffused. In addition, while
some medical decisions present a single
issue at a single moment, more often
patients face a series of decisions over days
or even months whose individual
importance is often not apparent at the
time. Even the non-medical aspects of
medical decisions may boggle patients. For
instance, people's "values" are often more
obscure than the theory of informed
consent assumes, and (reasonably enough)
they change over time and with experience.
Nor will it always be clear what
conclusions are to be drawn even from
well-established and stable preferences.
Furthermore, most medical decisions
are made by sick people, and sickness
impairs thought. When you are ill you are
weary. When you are ill you are diverted
by a regiment of unfamiliar problems, not
least reconciling yourself to your disease,
reconstructing your future, and coping

with the quotidian. You may want to avoid
facing the dismal facts of your illness. You
may even want to "deny" your condition
(which may be quite a wise deception).
You may not find your medical condition
absorbingly interesting. (We even have a
pejorative term - valetudinarian - for
people too fascinated by their illness.) And
you may be so frightened that you cannot
think lucidly and dispassionately.
All this may help us understand why
Janis speaks so discouragingly about how
patients address decisions. It also helps
explain the emerging evidence about how
patients go about making decisions.
One of the plainest elements of that
evidence suggests that patients often make
decisions with a rapidity that forecloses the
systematic deliberation many students of
decisions prescribe and the doctrine of
informed consent presupposes. This has
been most extensively studied among
people asked to donate a kidney, who tend
to decide instantly whether to donate or to
decline. As one study put it, "Not one of
the donors weighed alternatives and
rationally decided. Fourteen of the donors
and 9 of the 10 donors waiting for surgery
stated that they had made their decision
immediately when the subject of the
kidney transplant was first mentioned over
the telephone, 'in a split-second,'
'instantaneously,' and 'right away."' In
short, "all the donors and potential donors
interviewed ... reported a decisionmaking process that was immediate and
'irrational' and could not meet the
requirements adopted by the American
Medical Association to be accepted as an
'informed consent."'
The most detailed, circumstantial, and
vivid descriptions of how patients make
medical choices appear in the memoirs so
many of them have written about the
experience of illness. Many of these
memoirs, like the studies of kidney donors,
report truncated decisions. For one
lymphoma patient, for example, "[n]ot
even a split second was needed to opt for
chemotherapy despite all I had heard
about it."
Such instantaneous decisions are
possible partly because many patients seem
to fix on one factor, make it the basis of
decision, and then close their minds to
new data. (This psychological conservatism
is often called the "anchoring heuristic.")
Penny Pierce, one of the closest students of
how patients make medical decisions,
reports such thinking among many of the
breast cancer patients she studied.
Schneider frequently observed it among

people asked to choose a dialysis modality.
Such patients
"Often seem to listen until they hear
some arresting fact and then make it the
basis of their decision. For instance, as
soon as some patients hear that
hemodialysis requires someone to insert
two large needles into their arm three
times a week, they opt for whatever the
alternative is. When some other patients
hear peritoneal dialysis means having a
tube protruding from their abdomen, they
choose "the other kind of dialysis."

Not only do many patients decide
quickly and consult only a few criteria or even a single criterion - but even
patients well educated and reflective
enough to write memoirs regularly describe
no decisional process at all. Instead, they
invoke intuition, instinct, and impulse. An
AIDS patient, for example, wrote, "I've
learned to listen to my inner voice for
guidance when choosing treatments. If I
get what Louise refers to as a 'ding' (a
strong instinct) about a vitamin, herb,
drug, or other treatment, I try it." A
multiple sclerosis patient "got a flash,"
found that a "little light flashed inside my
head," came to "trust my instincts and
intuition," and asked why she should not
"play my hunches." Even the patients most
committed to making their own decisions
on rational bases often cannot, even in
retrospect, explain their choices. For
instance, a Rice sociologist with prostate
cancer who was virtually a poster-boy for
patient autonomy, wrote, "Without
knowing precisely why or being able to
provide a clear rationale, I decided I would
ask Peter Scardino to perform my surgery."

A case study: screening for
Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA)
Our survey of the evidence about the
two requirements for successful informed
consent suggests two things. First, we have
a great deal of evidence about how much
patients understand and retain of what
they are told by their doctors about their
medical choices: In brief, troublingly little.
Second, we have little evidence about how
patients analyze what they hear and
remember. But that evidence gives us good
reason to doubt that their analyses meet
the expectations of the bioethicists who
advocate informed consent or the judges
who demand it.
To gain further insight into the way
patients think about their medical choices,
let us examine a case study. The most
common cancer among men attacks the
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prostate. Traditionally, physicians tried to
detect prostate cancer before its symptoms
became acute by "digital rectal
examination," that is by trying to feel the
cancer in the prostate. However, this
method is roughly as effective as it is
pleasant, at least where the cancer is in its
early stages. This made it seem desirable to
find another way of identifying men with
this common and potentially fatal disease.
The best current way to do so arises from
the fact that distressed prostates emit
abnormally high levels of prostate-specific
antigen (PSA). A number of physicians
thus favor screening men by testing their
blood for elevated PSA levels and then,
where the PSA is elevated, performing
ultrasound examinations and, usually,
biopsies.
Other physicians, however, disagree.
These PSA skeptics make several points.
First, they observe that many things
besides prostate cancer can distress a
prostate and that therefore the PSA test
provokes numerous biopsies that reveal no
cancer. Indeed, at least 70 percent of the
men with elevated PSA levels do not have
cancer. The 30 percent who do from the
70 percent who don't are generally
distinguished through a biopsy of the
prostate. While the PSA test is relatively
inexpensive and only trivially burdensome
(it is a blood test often performed on men
who are already having blood drawn for
some other purpose), few men find the
biopsy agreeable. Furthermore, it is both
expensive and fallible.
Second, opponents of PSA screening say
that most prostate cancer grows so slowly
that most men who have the disease do not
die from it. Autopsies of men who did not
die of prostate cancer found evidence of
the disease in a quarter of the 65-year-olds
and 40 percent of the 85-year-olds. One
estimate is that 10 percent of all men
contract prostate cancer but only two to
three percent of these actually die or suffer
seriously from it. This suggests that for
most men, inaction may be the best
reaction to a diagnosis of prostate cancer.
Third, opponents of PSA screening note
that the treatments for prostate cancer surgery and radiation - can be painful
and that they are likely to cause quite
trying complications. Seventy percent of
the men treated suffer temporary
impotence or incontinence, and 30 percent
of those treated suffer from one of these
conditions permanently. Others have
persistent infections. Since the treatment
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will be unnecessary for many men, this
means that these complications would for those men - have been pointless. For
a number of other men, treatment will not
work. For these men, the unpleasantness
and complications of treatment may well
outweigh its benefits.
The studies necessary to determine
whether PSA screening is on balance
worthwhile are under way but are years
from completion. Meanwhile, opponents
of screening say there are hints that
screening - on the average - increases
life expectancy by only a few days and that
screening even reduces one's "quality
adjusted" life expectancy lead by a few
days. In short, the PSA skeptics fear that,
on average, screening does not improve
health and longevity and thus is not worth
the cost.
A number of attempts have been made
to resolve this controversy among
physicians by bringing them together to
issue guidelines. These attempts, however,
have failed. Instead, these groups have
recommended that each patient be given
the evidence and decide for himself. In
short, the medical dispute among doctors
has been deferred to their patients under
the aegis of informed consent.
How well will this work? How will men
confronted with these conflicting
arguments analyze them? To find out, we
interviewed 40 men who were 40 to 65
years old. They varied widely in income
and occupation. The men were on average
better educated than the American
population. Only nine of them had no
college experience, and three of these did
not finish high school.
The interviews were generally held in
the interviewee's home and lasted from one
to two hours. A central feature of the
interview was an attempt to give the men
the kind of information about whether to
be screened for PSA that an exceptionally
conscientious physician who was
struggling to be as neutral as possible
would offer. In other parts of the interview,
the men were also asked about their
health, their experience with prostate
problems and tests, their relationships with
physicians, their views about participating
in medical decisions, and their skill in
handling simple arithmetic.
Strikingly, the interviewees generally
seemed committed to making the kind of
formally correct cost-benefit decision that
has traditionally characterized the medical
literature on medical decisions. A number
of men not only aspired to make sound
decisions, but felt obliged to do so. They
disparaged friends or even spouses who

had avoided the responsibility of making
medical decisions. They often spoke
contemptuously of such people and their
dangerous course.
The interviews were structured to
promote the kind of rational decisions to
which the participants seemed to aspire.
The interviewer presented the relevant
medical data in much the way a careful
physician might (although at much greater
length than most physicians would have
time for) and tried to come as close as
possible to the idea envisioned by the
medical groups that have called for doctors
to give patients the information they need
to decide for themselves whether to be
screened.
The thinking of 40 men over a
prolonged discussion is not easily
summarized. When humans speak, their
ideas are fluid, incomplete, and even
contradictory. These men were no
different. Nevertheless, two central and
significant generalizations are inescapable:
First, only two of the 40 seemed to change
their minds about PSA screening despite all
the information they were given. This may
be partly because three-quarters of them
had already had a PSA test and because
prostate cancer and screening for it have by
now entered into public discourse.
Second, despite the professed desire of a
number of these men to make their own
rational decisions, and despite the
exceptionally favorable circumstances for
doing so, almost every participant
repeatedly reasoned in ways that seemed at
odds with his own aspirations. More
specifically, participants frequently seemed
swayed by unexamined assumptions,
which led them to ignore or
misunderstand the information they were
given. More specifically still, the
interviewees relied crucially on what might
be called principles of folk wisdom. An
examination of some of these principles
will reveal much about the way these men
thought about the problem they
confronted.
Prevention is good. Public health and
cancer education seemed to have done
their job almost too well. Participants had
fully imbibed the principle that
"prevention" is better than treatment, that
nothing is more crucial to combating
cancer than catching it early, and that
screening is the first step in early detection.
Thus one respondent said,

My mother is a retired registered nurse.
I've got a lot of health professionals in my
family. I've been aware of health and
healthcare all my life . ... I've been
blessed with good health, for the most
part, and I just did not want to run the
risk. I didn't want to do something
stupid . ... [I]f there's a test, or an exam,
or something, I'm going to take it . . .. I
just want to be preventive, instead of
[regretting] after the fact.

And another:
[My body's] like a machine . ...
[I]f there's a flat tire, I'll go ahead and
change it. If the oil's low, I'll go ahead
and change it . ... It's by taking
preventive measures like this [test] I've
been able to maintain a reasonable
amount of good health . ...

And in like vein:
Respondent: I honestly believe that
knowing, and having the option of
prevention, outweighs all the other risks
[of PSA screening] . ... [I]f you do the
proper things, it's just like starting a car.
You can have the key, and if you don't
unlock the door and stick it in the
ignition, you're not going anywhere. But
if you do the proper things: stick the key
in the door, unlock the door, stick it in
the ignition, put the seatbelt on for safety,
... you're going to go somewhere . ...
This is good sense, this is good medicine.
Interviewer: So you've said that
'prevention' really overrides this
uncertainty about PSA?
Respondent: The availability of prevention
has to be part of the system, part of the
schedule of benefits [for an HMO] .... I
mean, I think of prevention. I'm not
always that way, but prevention - you're
always in control of prevention.

Of course, the interviewees were
commonly doing more than applying the
general lesson of prevention and screening.
The advocates of PSA screening have had
much the better of the controversy in the
media, and the blessings of PSA screening
seem to have been well preached by
celebrities like Robert Dole and Arnold
Palmer. As one of the participants
remarked, prostate cancer "is all over the
TV now." That has had its effects.
It is of course entirely reasonable to
believe that PSA screening is wise because
it makes it possible to detect disease early
and thus to treat it more effectively. The
controversy over screening exists precisely
because many estimable authorities accept
that view. But such a position is reasonable
only after one has grappled with the
proposition that, in the particular case of
PSA screening, the general argument in
favor of screening does not work. Many of

these men seemed so powerfully driven by
an idealized version of "prevention" that
they had difficulty hearing, understanding,
and analyzing a reason PSA screening
might be desirable.
To put the point a bit differently,
screening often works just as it is supposed
to. It works for easily apprehended
reasons. The virtues of screening have been
drummed into the public over many years
of virtuous advertising. As the passages
quoted a moment ago suggest, screening is
easily analogized to familiar and desirable
practices, like routine maintenance of one's
car. All one's educated intuitions, in short,
make PSA screening seem like common
sense and the arguments against screening
seem foolish. Taking those arguments
seriously requires an uncomfortable and
burdensome re-examination of what seem
like settled questions. Personal experience
suggests to most people that such reexaminations are rarely worth the effort,
and they are thus resisted.
Many of these men were also diverted
from thinking clearly about their choices
by their tendency to call PSA screening
"prevention." But PSA screening does not
prevent disease, it reveals it. Effective
prevention relieves people of any of the
consequences of disease and treatment,
and prevention is often virtually free of
risk. On average, then, prevention is much
more effective than screening, and
conflating the two makes screening more
attractive than it will often deserve.
Control is Good. Some years ago,
"control freak" was a term of
disparagement. Today, Americans feel with
increasing conviction that people need to
take and maintain control over their
circumstances. Control even takes on a
moral dimension, for taking responsibility
often means taking control. PSA testing
appealed to a number of these men
because it was a way of taking control and
responsibility for their health: "[T]here are
a limited number of things that you can
control in your life .... I like to keep as
many of those as possible." PSA screening
looked attractive because it was seen as a
form of "prevention" and prevention was
seen as a way of having control:
"[P]revention -you're always in control of
prevention." More than half our
participants used negative stories about
other people who had failed to assume
responsibility for their health by using
PSA screening.
Now, if they don't get a PSA, and then
they get [cancer], I have no sympathy for
'em. That's just stupid on their part, they

could have prevented it, but didn't. They
could all die for all I care . ... [W]hy
should we pay for their unnecessary
medical care? No doubt it's their doctor's
fault, too; a doctor is supposed to prevent
things, not ignore them.

The association of PSA screening with
"control" suggests another reason men may
be reluctant to grapple with the argument
against screening. That argument
disturbingly suggests that, in the present
state of knowledge, medicine fights
prostate cancer ineptly. taking that
argument seriously means confronting
medicine's limits with disquieting
directness. In addition, that confrontation
challenges another idea of psychological
importance - that if you live right, you
will live long, that you can avoid all harm
if you are just careful enough. As one
interviewee said, "If you avoid all these
things that are bad they got these days,
you'll be rewarded with life. You have to
take care of yourself, get the proper
checkups and tests." In short, the desire for
control provides another reason to accept
PSA screening with little thought and to
resist examining the argument against it.
Information is Good. The survey
literature now insistently suggests that
most patients believe they want a good
deal of information about their illnesses.
The participants in this study shared a
nearly axiomatic belief that information is
always good to have. Some of these men
had quite plausible reasons. One common
reason for wanting information is wanting
good news. Some men see PSA testing not
as a way of detecting cancer but as a way
of hearing comforting news: "[I]f you have
a negative test, then you say, hey, you're
really reassured that nothing is going to
happen."
Another common reason for wanting
information is a belief that forewarned is
forearmed.
Everything affects our life, but that
[prostate cancer] affects the end of your
life, so you need to know . ... Nobody
anticipates when they're gonna die . ... If
it happens, it happens, but if you know
it's going to happen, you put yourself into
an advantage situation of being able to
accomplish things that you've put off,
things that you've wanted to do, or .. .
maybe experimental medication . .. .

Or, as another man put it,
I would rather know what information's
available, and which way to go, so I've got
all the information to make some kind of
a sensible decision of what I'm gonna do
with myself. ...
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Other men seemed committed to "more
information" even if its usefulness might be
obscure. These men might acknowledge
the possible disadvantages of PSA testing
but then suggest that even a misleading
PSA is better than no test. One man said
that a PSA test is Not a gamble. I mean, do it. It's silly not
to . . . . [L]ogic would dictate the tests are
there, they're available, and they're
reasonably accurate, even if they're not
100 percent.

As another interviewee said,
You're attempting to try and find out
what's going on [with the prostate] . ...
[T]he PSA may not be exact, but at least
it is some measure, and as time goes on it
will become more precise, but
nonetheless, it's something.

These men are recruiting a standard
aphorism from common sense - that half
a loaf is better than none, that some
information is always better than none.
The aphorism is inappropriate, however,
since the uncertainty lies not just in the
accuracy of the test, but also in what to do
if cancer is diagnosed. Few things seemed
more counter-intuitive to many of these
men than the suggestions that a lack of
knowledge could be better than
knowledge.
Even participants who seemed to
acknowledge some of the arguments
against PSA screening emphasized how
important "knowing" is.
I didn't understand [PSA statistics
before], to be honest with you. I didn't
realize about all these numbers, and it
may sound silly, but I still like the idea of
doing the blood test, only because I'm
always curious about these things, I just
like to see.

The same man said,
But if I get a positive result, I'm not sure
I'll do anything. The potential [adverse
effects of treatment] here, would make
life very unpleasant, [and] outweigh the
small possibility of dying.

He saw PSA screening, then, as a way of
putting off a decision about how to
respond to prostate cancer until the evil
moment of knowledge actually arrived.
But if I start to get a positive result, then
that's something I should find additional
information about, look into, you know,
really make a decision about.

Other participants put their preference
for information in yet starker terms. As one
frankly said, "I can't explain why [I want
screening]. I just like to see tests." And
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another participant felt so intensely that
information is good and ignorance bad that
he saw the argument against PSA screening
as part of a conspiracy to keep him in
ignorance.
You can't put the genie back in the bottle.
The awareness is there. People like
myself are spreading the word, of
advantages of PSA. I don't care [if the
cancer] is latent or active . . . . [W]ho do
you think shows up at those meetings [on
cancer screening nights]? Opinion
leaders, people that want the information.
Now, you [showed] your statistical work
[to me], but it's the opinion leaders that
tell 10 others. You unleashed the dragon.
[The speaker at the screening night] said,
pure and simple, just like that - ... he
knows how many other groups are talking
about [PSA].

There is, or course, much to be said for
having information about one's health.
However, here as with the other two
axioms we have explored, the danger is
that the simple principle "information is
good" operates so powerfully and is
accepted so uncritically that men do not
hear and consider the arguments that
suggest that the information provided by
PSA tests may be bought at a high price
(because the PSA test itself produces so
many false positives) and is unexpectedly
uninformative (because there is - in the
mind of PSA skeptics - no satisfactory
evid_ence about what men with prostate
cancer should do and thus reason to think
they should do nothing).
Technology is Good. Another common
element of folk wisdom in American
culture is the steady progress of technology
and medical science. Some of the
interviewees saw PSA screening as the
"state of the art" and believed they should
take advantage of the best medical science
had to offer.
We already know about heart disease.
We already know about certain forms of
cancer that are caused by smoking. We
know about emphysema, that's usually a
byproduct of smoking. Right now,
prostate cancer is a treatable problem.
You know, [PSA] is a good. Right now
there isn't anything else.

Some saw being screened as a necessary
best step toward the next technology:
If I were presented with a positive PSA
test, I guess the most logical thing is to
get a second confirming PSA test. But
there will be another test that the medical
community will come up with in the
future, and that will work better than the
PSA . ... If I don't get the PSA, then I
won't know to get that [other] test, I
won't be able to benefit from the advance.

. . . There was a time when the PSA didn't
exist, after all, and men were subject to
cancer without warning. Now, the PSA is
here, and something else will be
discovered soon.

Statistics are Lies. A number of the
participants scorned the arguments against
PSA screening because they shared the
common American skepticism of, and even
contempt for, statistics. That skepticism is
summarized by one man's use of the cliche
"you can prove anything you want with
statistics." Similar doubts led other men to
such conclusions as a belief that all
statistical uncertainty was automatically a
"50-50 chance," so that either choice was
appropriate, or a "toss-up."
Respondent: The numbers [don't matter]
. . .. I don't want to take chances with
all that stuff. I might die, I might not. I

might get those [side effects of impotence
and incontinence], I might not. Either
way, I got a 50-50 chance, you know,
I might as well guess .
Interviewer: Hmm. Remember those
numbers here aren't exactly 50-50, your
chances could be worse, maybe of getting
a side effect, or maybe a lot better, like
living for years without problems [from
the cancer].
Respondent: Yeah, I hear you. But I figure

it's a gamble, an even chance either way,
you know, 50-50. Since you don't know,
you know you're saying 30 percent here,
you might as well guess either way. You
got an even chance of good or bad.

This skepticism of statistics could shade
into an acid distrust of those who
purported to use them:
Now the person [who is] saying the PSA
tests aren't that valid . ... What would
happen if their mother went in and got a
pap smear, and it was positive, or their
father went in and got a PSA that was a
5? ... Right then and there they'd want
to do everything possible to see what was
going on. Yet it's very easy for them to
say, ''.Joe Blow down there, he may not
have it 'cause he's got a PSA of 5." When
you start throwing statistics around, I
think it's a cop-out, in a way, for these
people. I always say, "[I]f I was your
mother or father, or your son or your
daughter, what would you do?" And if
they're telling the truth, they're gonna
say, "[W]ell I'd do everything possible."

"I knew someone once who ... " One
of the best-studied defects in human
reasoning is the tendency to prefer a few
vivid examples to systematic but dry
statistical data. The participants in this
study were as prone to this failing as

anyone else. The interviews were strewn
with stories of friends and relatives who
had been saved by testing.
I think my impression initially was that
[my physician] didn't want to do the test,
and I insisted that we do it. You know,
I'll make the decision about what I'm
going to do . ... I think about Bo
Schembechler [one-time University of
Michigan football coach and a sainted
name in Ann Arbor], he had a prostate
operation, and [a friend of mine], and
somebody else, a pretty renowned citizen
- oh! Schwarzkopf, General
Schwarzkopf.

Often these stories did not involve PSA
screening, but rather involved quite
different kinds of cases, from other blood
tests such as cholesterol to decisions about
children with congenital heart disease.
You know, a one in 1,000 chance may not
sound like much, but I had an aunt that
was told she had a one in 1,000 chance of
having a blood clot go to her brain
through a procedure she was going to
have, and it happened . ... [l]t's all risky,
but I still think it provides a framework
for decision making even if it's not totally
accurate, because you can't have complete
accuracy.

"If it weren't for bad luck, I'd have no
luck at all." Finally, some men implicitly
relied on old beliefs about a purposive
fortune. At least six complained quite
seriously about their bad luck. From this
they concluded that PSA testing might be
bad for the general population but
necessary for themselves.
Respondent: Oh, I understand you all

right, and I don't think most people
should have a PSA . ... I still want it
because bad things happen to me. I'm the
guy with bad luck, the one percent.
Interviewer: You told me you don't have a

family history of cancer, right?
Respondent: Yeah, but I'm just like [the

men with a family history] . . .. I'll get
cancer because I get everything else.

This PSA study does not, of course,
prove that people make medical decisions
badly. lt does, however, suggest a
hypothesis that may help explain how
patients so often seem to be able to make
medical decisions with more rapidity than
the complexity of their choices might seem
to justify. Often, the participants seem to
have short-circuited their consideration or
fallen back on axiomatic principles current
in American culture. These principles are
not necessarily problematic in themselves
although some of them were (like the facile

dismissal of all statistics). The problem,
rather, is that these principles seem so right
(and may in the proper circumstances be
so unexceptionable) that they make it
seductively easy for the participants
confronted with an unappealing and
counter-intuitive proposition (PSA
screening is not a good bet) to dismiss the
information without reflecting on it and
instead to leap to a conclusion.

The cure for the ills of .
informed consent
The problems patients have in
understanding and retaining what they are
told are well known. And evidence is
beginning to accumulate about the
difficulty patients have in analyzing the
information they are given and making a
sound decision about it. The hypothesis we
investigated in the preceding section helps
substantiate the suggestions that patients
often seem to resolve medical questions
with a speed that would inhibit thoughtful
consideration of the information presented
to them. Added to the other doubts we
have already reviewed about how patients
receive and process information, the
hypothesis raises questions about what can
be hoped for from informed consent.
The conventional response to concerns
of this kind has most typically been: 'The
only cure for the ills of informed consent is
more informed consent." Many of these
suggestions have to do with ways of
conveying information more effectively, as
by improving the way forms are worded,
or by having people other than doctors
explain choices to patients, or by making
videos part of informed consent. As it has
become clear that such changes do less
than had been hoped, doctors have been
urged to expand the range of information
they impart and the range of situations in
which they offer informed consent.
(The movement away from guidelines and
toward patient choice in PSA screening
exemplifies the latter tendency.) A sense
of the ambition - one might almost say
desperation - of these proposals is to be
found by examining a recent article by
Geller et al. (Gail Geller, et al., '"Decoding'
informed Consent: Insights from Women
Regarding Breast Cancer Susceptibility
Testing," 27 Hastings Center Report 28,
March/April 1997). Among its
recommendations:
There should be an "in-depth
exploration by providers of patients'
affective and cognitive processes," since
"[p]roviders who rely on a discrete or
short-term approach to informed

consent are unlikely to succeed at
understanding fundamental patient
beliefs and preferences and thereby have
little hope of obtaining truly informed
consent."
"It is particularly important in the
area of genetics and genetic testing for
provider-patient interactions to explore
uncertainties and limitations both in the
provider's own knowledge and in the
state of the science."
"[I] f they are to fasilitate truly
informed decision making on the part
of their patients, providers must
understand and disclose their own
motivations, beliefs, and values to
patients."
"Concerns about autonomy should
be broadened from a sole focus on the
voluntariness of the decision itself to
include a focus on the voluntariness of
the decision making process.
providers ought to explore what kind of
role expectations the patient has for
herself and her provider."
Finally, "informed consent ought to
be individualized ... and take place in
the context of an ongoing relationship
with a trusted healthcare provider."
People are driven to such effulgent
visions of informed consent in part by the
strength of the autonomist ideal in
American life, law, and medicine. More
particularly, they are not insubstantially
motivated by the rise of the view among
some bioethicists and even some doctors
and patients that, as a matter of good
medical practice and even as a matter of
moral duty, patients ought to make their
own medical decisions even if they would
rather delegate them to someone else.
Those who espouse this "mandatory
autonomism" must hope to perfect
informed consent for want of a better way
of achieving their goals.

The limits of informed consent
One interpretation of the PSA study this
paper describes is that informed consent
was a success, that the men took the
information they were given and applied
their own "values" to it, with the results we
have seen. This is true at least in the
narrow (but not trivial) sense that people
formulate and evince their values by
making decisions. It is also true in the
sense that these men genuinely subscribe
to the culturally axiomatic ideas on which
they relied.
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But there is an important sense in which
this interpretation of the study seems false.
It is unlikely that the men wanted to make
decisions in the way they seem to have
done. Indeed, when asked about how they
wanted to make decisions, the men in the
study tended to espouse quite conventional
views of how decisions ought to be made.
Most people want to make decisions as
well as they can. Most people believe that
making good decisions requires listening to
the arguments on both sides carefully
enough to understand them. One might
even wonder whether these men were
aware of how they were making decisions.
Possibly, but probably not, since the
psychological mechanism at work is one
which ordinarily does not reveal itself to its
user.
Nor is the way the men often seemed to
be reasoning consonant with the principles
of informed consent as they have ordinarily
been understood. Those principles assume
that patients will grapple as directly with
the advantages and disadvantages of their
medical choices as possible. Why proffer
substantial amounts of difficult information
about difficult choices if consideration of
them is thus to be short-circuited?
Furthermore, there is a public interest in
having them reach sound decisions, both
because the cost of medical care is
generally shared and because the lives of
patients are valuable to the people around
them and even society at large.
This paper has expressed doubts about
how well patients hear and remember what
they are told and about how well they are
able to reflect on the choices presented to
them. But what is to be concluded from
these doubts' Should informed consent be
abandoned? Of course not. This is not the
place for a full-scale reconsideration of
informed consent; this paper will have
done its job if it directs attention to the
grotesquely understudied issue of how
patients make medical decisions. But a few
words of clarification are no doubt needed.
The doubts this paper has expressed
about informed consent do not require
anything like abandoning informed
consent. There are many reasons for this
but space for only a few. First, sometimes
informed consent works in something like
the way bioethicists and courts envision.
Some people are well situated to make
medical decisions. Some "medical"
decisions can be well made by many
patients. Second, most people want at least

64

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

some of the information the doctrine of
informed consent intends for them to have.
Third, some of the information given in
informed consent helps patients care for
their illness better even if it does not help
them make medical decisions. Fourth,
informed consent may have value even if it
is only a ritual, for it reminds doctors of
their duties of concern and deference to
their patients, duties it is easy for them to
forget and neglect in the press of the other
duties that surround them.
The question, then, is not whether to
discard informed consent, but what to
expect of it. The material surveyed in this
paper raises the possibility that there are
real limits to our ability to solve the two
problems of informed consent and thus to
what it is reasonable to hope for from it.
The PSA study illustrates a number of
those limits. Not the least of these is time.
In the artificial setting of this study, time
could be lavished on a single medical
question in a way that would be flatly
impossible in almost any ordinary medical
situation. Yet interviewees still came away
from this educational extravagance without
having fully understood and confronted
the arguments presented to them.
But why is this surprising' Teaching
and learning are both humblingly difficult,
as any student and any teacher knows. Yet
teachers and students teach and learn in
virtually ideal settings compared to those
in which doctor and patient must labor.
And when the subject of the teaching and
learning is as fraught with disturbing ideas
and with unrecognized and unreliable
assumptions as medical decisions, it is
hardly surprising that people should
almost struggle to avoid the task of
learning.
Indeed, a substantial number of patients
expressly say, when asked, that they do not
want to make their own medical decisions.
And the sicker patients are, the less likely
they are to want to make their own
medical decisions. The task of education is
always daunting. How much more
daunting must it be when the learners do
not wish to use what is being taught?
The PSA study suggests another
practical limit on the scope of informed
consent. The participants in that study
seemed often to be relying on powerful
cultural axioms that allowed them to
dismiss much of what they were being
told. They may not fully have realized what
they were doing, and it seems likely that
physicians trying to inform them would
often not realize all that was going on in
their minds. Furthermore, there is good
reason to think that patients will often be

influenced by misapprehensions of whose
existence or strength their physicians are
unaware. For example, it seems not to be
generally thought that patients who have
agreed to become research subjects
considerably over-estimate their chances of
benefiting from the experimental treatment
even when they have been told what those
chances actually are. These research
subjects "systematically misinterpret the
risk/benefit ratio of participation in
research because they fail to understand
the underlying scientific methodology"
(Paul S. Appelbaum et al., "False Hopes
and Best Data: Consent to Research and
the Therapeutic Misconception," 17
Hastings Center Report 20, 21, April 1987).
And like the participants in the PSA study,
they are saved from difficult choices by
misplaced reliance on a cultural truth:
"Most people have been socialized to
believe that physicians (at least ethical
ones) always provide personal care. It may
therefore be very difficult, perhaps nearly
impossible, to persuade subjects that this
encounter is different ...
What is more, it appears that even
willing physicians have had trouble in
overcoming this kind of misapprehension:
The investigator in one of the projects we
studied offered his subjects detailed and
extensive information in a process that
often extended over several days and
included one session in which the entire
project was reviewed. Despite this, half
the subjects failed to grasp that treatment
would be assigned on a random basis,
four of 20 misunderstood how placebos
would be used, five of 20 were not aware
of the use of a double-blind, and eight of
20 believed that medications would be
adjusted according to their individual
needs.

Doctors should surely do their best to
give patients the information they want.
But it is time to consider the possibility
that doctors will never be able to
communicate to patients all the
information they need in a way that they
can use effectively. It is the rare physician
who has the skill and the time to probe
deep enough into the patient's mind to
discover the misapprehensions of fact and
the inapt reliance on truths that distort
what patients hear and think about the
problems they face. It may therefore be
time to acknowledge the limits of informed
consent and to search elsewhere for ways
of helping patients secure what they want
from medicine.
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